In this paper we show that the Schematic Protection Model SPM subsumes several well-known protection models as particular instances. We show this for a diverse collection of models including the Bell-LaPadula multi-level security model, take-grant models, and grammatical protection systems. Remarkably SPM subsumes these models within its known e ciently decidable cases for safety analysis i.e., the determination or whether or not a given privilege can possibly beacquired by a particular subject. Therefore SPM subsumes these models not only in terms of its expressive power but also in terms of safety analysis. This is in sharp contrast to the HarrisonRuzzo-Ullman HRU access-matrix model. HRU does subsume all the models discussed in this paper in terms of expressive power. However, all known constructions of these models in HRU require multi-conditional commands i.e., commands whose conditions have two or more terms, whereas safety is undecidable in HRU even for bi-conditional commands i.e., commands whose conditions have exactly two terms.
INTRODUCTION
Access controls for protection and sharing of information and physical resources are an essential component of any multi-user computer system. For this purpose, these systems are typically viewed as consisting of subjects and objects. Subjects are generally the active entities such as users or processes, while objects are passive entities such as text les. Protection is enforced by ensuring that subjects can execute only those operations for which they are authorized.
Access controls are useful to the extent they meet the user community's needs. They need to be exible so that individual users can specify access of other users to the objects they control. At the same time the discretionary power given to individual users must be constrained to meet the overall objectives and policies of an organization. For example, members of a project team might be allowed to freely share project documents with each other but only the project leader is authorized to allow non-members to read project documents.
The protection state of a system is de ned by the privileges in subjects' domains at a given moment. Hereafter, we understand state to mean protection state. Inert privileges authorize operations that do not modify the state, e.g., reading or writing a le. Control privileges authorize control operations that modify the protection state, e.g., user X authorizes user Y to read le Z. Control privileges de ne the dynamics of authorization. Once the initial state has been established, y the protection state evolves by the autonomous actions of subjects constrained by control privileges. The challenge is to ensure that all reachable states conform with the policy that the security administrator wishes to implement.
A protection model provides a framework for specifying the dynamics of the protection state. This is usually done by stating rules which prescribe the authorization for making incremental changes in the state. We call such a collection of rules an authorization scheme, often abbreviated simply as scheme. To understand the implications of a scheme it must be possible to determine the cumulative e ect of authorized incremental changes in the protection state. The incremental state changes authorized by a scheme may appear innocent enough in isolation, although their cumulative effect turns out to be undesirable. So for a given initial state and authorization scheme, we need to characterize protection states that are reachable.
This problem was rst identi ed in 14 where it is called the safety problem. In its most basic form, the safety question asks: is there a reachable state in which a particular subject possesses a particular privilege which it did not previously possess?
We view a privilege as an unde ned primitive concept. For the most part, privileges can be treated as synonymous to access rights. However, there are privileges such as security level and type which are usually represented as attributes of subjects and objects rather than as access rights.
y The initial state is established by the security administrator at the moment of system generation. The mechanics of this procedure are inherently implementation dependent, and therefore not modeled within SPM.
It is the fundamental question which a protection model must confront. Since subjects are usually authorized to create new subjects and objects, the system is unbounded and it is not certain that such analysis will be decidable, let alone tractable, without sacri cing generality.
Safety analysis becomes particularly complex when control privileges can themselves bedynamically acquired. To illustrate the need for propagating control privileges, consider the example above where only the project leader is authorized to allow non-members to read project documents. This policy can beenforced by giving the project leader a special control privilege not available to ordinary project members. Suppose in addition we wish to allow the project leader to delegate this special authority to a project member, say while the project leader is absent on a business trip. This can be achieved by allowing the project leader to grant the special control privilege to project members.
Analysis issues were rst formalized by Harrison, Ruzzo and Ullman 14 in the context of the well-known access matrix model 13, 17 . The matrix has a row for each subject and a column for each subject or object. The X,Y cell of the matrix contains symbols called rights which authorize subject X to perform operations on entity Y. An authorization scheme is de ned by a set of commands. Each command has a condition part and a body. The condition speci es the rights that are required to exist in the matrix before the body can be executed for its actual arguments. The bodyconsists of a sequence of primitive operations. The primitive operations enter or delete a right from a cell of the matrix, create a new row or column, or destroy a n existing row or column. This model is hereafter called HRU.
In the general HRU setting safety is undecidable 14 . Furthermore safety remains undecidable even if the condition part of each command has at most two terms and there are no delete or destroy operations in the body 15 . The very weak assumptions from which undecidability follows are most disappointing. There does not appear to be any natural and useful special case of this model for which safety is e ciently decidable 14, 15 . Speci cally, safety in HRU is known to be decidable for monoconditional monotonic commands 15 i.e., commands whose condition part has only one term but is undecidable even for bi-conditional monotonic commands 15 i.e., commands whose condition part has exactly two terms. Most practical systems require multi-conditional commands i.e., commands whose condition part has two o r more terms.
The schematic protection model SPM 34 was developed in response to this situation. SPM provides considerably more structure than HRU. It classi es subjects and objects into protection types. The dynamic component of a protection state in SPM consists of tickets capabilities. The key idea is that the authorization scheme is speci ed in terms of protection types. In particular, subject creation is authorized by a can-create binary relation on types. Safety is decidable provided this relation is acyclic, and in certain cases even if it has cycles of length one 34 . On the other hand with arbitrary cycles in can-create, safety is undecidable 38 . Fortunately, it appears that SPM schemes of practical interest satisfy the decidability constraints, as demonstrated by the constructions of this paper and the examples of 32, 3 3 , 34, 36 . Our objective in this paper is to demonstrate that SPM subsumes several wellknown protection models as special cases. Speci cally, w e show that the Bell-LaPadula multi-level security model 3 , take-grant models 16, 21, 41 and grammatical protection systems 10, 22 are particular instances of SPM.
Remarkably in all our constructions the resulting SPM scheme has e cient safety analysis. Therefore SPM subsumes these models not only in terms of its expressive power but also in terms of safety analysis. This is in sharp contrast to HRU. HRU can simulate all the models discussed in this paper. However, because of its very weak safety properties HRU is unable to subsume these models within its known decidable classes for safety. z However, all known constructions of these models in HRU require multi-conditional commands i.e., commands whose conditions have two or more terms, whereas safety is undecidable in HRU even for bi-conditional commands i.e., commands whose conditions have exactly two terms 15 . In SPM, on the other hand, these models are all simulated by acyclic attenuating schemes which are known to have decidable safety 34 .
Taken collectively our constructions demonstrate that the safety results for SPM subsume a diversity of published safety results for protection models. In and of itself each construction is also notable for the following reasons. The construction for multi-level security models shows that the traditional black-and-white distinction between mandatory and discretionary controls in the Bell-LaPadula model has an alternate expression in SPM in terms of constraints on the propagation of access rights. The SPM viewpoint has the advantage of providing explicit machinery for formulating policies in between" these two extremes. The construction for theft in take-grant models shows a great advantage of SPM whereby assumptions about the behavior of subjects are easily speci ed as part of a scheme. SPM, therefore, gives us a powerful framework for investigating the consequences of assumptions about trusted behavior. Finally, the construction for grammatical systems demonstrates the ability of SPM to simulate models whose control operations are at rst sight quite contrary to SPM control operations. It also completes the simulation of take-grant analysis within SPM, since aspects of this analysis require a combination of our constructions for theft and grammatical systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We begin by reviewing SPM and its analysis results respectively in Sections 2 and 3. Section 4 discusses the concept of equivalence among systems and subsumption among models. Section 5 shows that the Bell-LaPadula multi-level security model 3 and several variations of it are expressible as SPM schemes. Section 6 considers how several variations of the takegrant model 16, 21, 41 can be simulated in SPM. Section 7 shows that grammatical protection systems 10, 22 are particular instances of SPM. The constructions of Sections 5, 6 and 7 are largely independent of each other and can be read in any order. Section 8 concludes the paper.
THE SCHEMATIC PROTECTION MODEL
In this Section we review the de nition of SPM. Our review is necessarily brief. Motivational details for various components of the model are given in 34 . The only di erence in notation with respect to 34 is in describing the create-rules.
SPM recognizes two kinds of entities, called subjects and objects, in a system. Subjects can possess privileges and may or may not beactive agents in the system. Objects, on the other hand, are purely containers of information. They do not possess privileges and are inherently passive. SPM regards subjects and objects as mutually exclusive. In the literature, subjects are often de ned to be a subset of objects. This amounts to calling what SPM calls entities as objects and coining some other term say, pure objects for entities which are not subjects. In SPM terminology a process is a subject, and operations e.g., signal can beperformed on subjects. In the literature, a process is often called a subject when we talk about the process executing operations on other objects, whereas it is called an object when we talk about operations performed on that process. These nuances of terminology are quite straightforwad, but it is important t o keep them in mind while reading the paper.
The key notion in SPM is that all entities are instances of protection types. Instances of the same protection type are treated uniformly by control privileges. Hereafter, we understand type to mean protection type. SPM assumes strong typing in that every entity is created to beof a speci c type which cannot change thereafter. The domain of an SPM subject has two parts: a static type-dependent part de ned by the scheme and a dynamic part consisting of tickets capabilities. The scheme is de ned in terms of types by the security administrator when a system is rst set-up and thereafter does not change. Major policy decisions are built into the scheme while details are re ected in the initial distribution of tickets.
Tickets are privileges of the form Y x. Y x is an ordered pair where Y identi es some unique entity and the right symbolx authorizes the possessor of this ticket to perform some operations on Y. Tickets are unforgeable and cannot be generated at will by a subject. They can be acquired only in accordance with speci c rules which comprise the scheme. The assumption that a ticket carries only one right symbol simpli es the formal framework without loss of generality. Capabilities with multiple right symbols then correspond to sets of tickets. We often abbreviate sets of tickets in this manner, e.g., Y uvw denotes the set of tickets fY u, Y v, Y wg.
TYPES AND RIGHT SYMBOLS
The rst step in de ning a scheme is to specify the disjoint sets of object types TO and subject types TS. Their union T is the entire set of entity t ypes. Types identify classes of entities which have common properties for security purposes. For subjects this may be membership in a department or a particular position of authority in a group, such as project leader. For objects this may be a classi cation such as an internal document or a public document. Types are usually named in lower case italics and entities in upper case roman script. Similarly italics and roman script are used to name sets, functions and relations whose domains involve types and entities respectively. The type of entity Y is denoted by typeY.
The next or perhaps concurrent step is to de ne the right symbols carried by tickets. For this purpose the set of right symbols R is partitioned into two disjoint subsets: the inert rights RI and the control rights RC. Examples of inert rights are the typical read, write, execute and append access rights for a le. The interpretation of control rights will be discussed shortly. We emphasize that SPM does not interpret the inert rights, but rather treats them as abstract symbols. The security administrator is free to de ne RI as the collection of symbols appropriate for the particular system of interest. The interpretation of these symbols, e.g., that r means read and w means write, is informal and is not speci ed in the SPM scheme. On the other hand, the interpretation of the control rights is speci ed in the SPM scheme in terms of link predicates and lter functions.
Every right symbolx comes in two variations x and xc, where c is the copy ag. The only di erence between Y x and Y xc is that the former ticket cannot be copied from one subject to another whereas the latter may be,provided certain additional conditions to be de ned shortly are true. It follows that presence of Y xc in a domain implies presence of Y x but not vice versa. We use x : c to denote x or xc with the understanding that multiple occurrences of x : c in the same context are either all read as x or all as xc. When used with multiple right symbols on a ticket the copy ag applies to each symbol, that is Y uvwc denotes fY uc, Y vc, Y wcg.
We denote the type of a ticket Y x : c by typeY x : c and de ne it to be the ordered pair typeY x : c. That is, the type of a ticket is determined by the type of entity it addresses and the right symbolit carries. Conventions for representing tickets, especially regarding the copy ag, extend in an obvious way to ticket types. In particular typeY x and typeY xc are di erent. This is an important distinction because of the role of the copy ag. The entire set of ticket types is TR.
The remaining components of a scheme are de ned in terms of functions and relations involving the sets TS, T and TR. SPM requires that T and R be nite, so a scheme is de ned by nite sets, relations and functions. SPM recognizes two operations that change the protection state: copy and create. x 
THE COPY OPERATION
The copy operation moves a copy of a ticket from the domain of one subject to the domain of another, leaving the original ticket intact. We often speak of copying a ticket from one subject to another although technically a ticket is copied from one subject's domain to another's domain.
The copy operation requires three independent pieces of authorization. A formal statement of these three conditions is given in Section 2.2.2.
1. The original ticket in the source subject's domain must carry the copy ag. 2. There must be a link from the source subject to the destination subject. In general an SPM scheme de nes a collection of link predicates flink i g for this purpose. A link i is said to exist from one subject to another provided the predicate link i evaluates to true in a given state. 3. Finally the lter function f i associated with the link predicate link i must also authorize the operation.
The subscript i is used to distinguish one link predicate from another as well as to maintain the association between link predicates and lter functions. The symboliis usually chosen to have some mnemonic signi cance with respect to the control rights which establish the link or the purpose of the link. We n o w formally de ne links and lter functions.
LINK PREDICATES
In an SPM scheme a nite collection of link predicates is de ned. Each predicate takes two subjects, say U and V, as arguments and evaluates to true or false. If true, it establishes a connection from U to V which can be used to copy tickets from U to V. The de nition of each link predicate is in terms of the presence of some combination of control tickets for U and V in the domains of U and V. The idea is that link predicates can therefore be evaluated by examining the domains of the two subjects of concern and that too only with respect to presence of control tickets for these two subjects. That the de nition should depend only on the presence and not
x In its original formulation SPM included a third operation called demand. Demand is not used in the constructions of this paper and is known to be formally redundant 37 . the absence of tickets is a well-known principle for protection 31 . As a special case we also allow a link predicate which is always true to bede ned. Formally we have the following de nition.
De nition 1 Let domU be the set of tickets possessed by subject U. A local link predicate link i U,V with U and V as formal parameters is de ned as a conjunction or disjunction, but not negation, of the following terms for any z2RC: U z2domU, U z2domV, V z2domU, V z2domV, and true.
For a given state if link i A,B is true we s a y there is a link i from A to B. We emphasize the existence of a link is necessary but not su cient for copying tickets from A to B. Examples of local link predicates from the literature are listed below.
The rst example is from the take-grant model 21 where the t and g control rights are respectively read as take and grant. The next two examples each retain just one of these privileges 23 . The fourth example is from the send-receive mechanism 28, 32 where the s and r control rights are respectively read as send and receive. The rst four cases are de ned in terms of control tickets for U in V's domain or vice versa. The next three cases are quite di erent and are de ned in terms of a control ticket for U in U's domain or similarly for V. The last case is unique in that it requires no tickets for a link to exist. There are other interesting possibilities for de ning link predicates. We a n ticipate that simple predicates of the kind de ned above will su ce in practice, although the model does allow for arbitrarily complex ones.
Since SPM is a model and not an implementation, the precise mechanics by which a link is evaluated to be true or false are deliberately left unspeci ed. The conservative approach would be to evaluate a link on every occasion that a copy operation is attempted using that link. It is possible to have implementations where the link is evaluated once and cached" to enable several copy operations. Similarly it is left unspeci ed whether subjects have to explicitly identify which link to use in a copy operation or whether the operating system will search for the existence of a suitable link. At this level of detail there are numerous alternatives consistent with the abstract SPM model.
FILTER FUNCTIONS
The nal condition required for authorizing a copy operation is de ned by the lter Some possible values of f i u,v are TR, TORI and respectively authorizing all tickets, inert tickets and no tickets to be copied from a subject of type u to a subject of type v over a link i .
The copy ag, link predicates and lter functions together authorize a copy operation in this manner. The rst two conditions depend on the protection state whereas the third depends only on the scheme. Note that Y xc is required in domU for copying either of Y xc or Y x. The lter function determines whether or not the copied ticket can have the copy ag. Selectivity i n copying is controlled by the lter function entirely in terms of types.
We emphasize that there is a di erent lter function f i for each predicate link i . Also, the value of a lter function f i can specify a di erent set of ticket types for each pair of its argument subject types. Filter functions are a powerful tool for specifying policies. They impose non-discretionary controls which are inviolable and con ne the discretionary behavior of individual subjects.
SPM imposes no assumptions regarding the role of U and V in a copy operation from U to V. For worst-case analysis it is equally acceptable that copying take place at the initiative of U or V alone or require both to cooperate. In this respect SPM is similar to HRU, which also does not specify which of the many subjects involved in a command are regarded as initiators of the command.
THE CREATE OPERATION
The create operation introduces new subjects and objects in the system. There are two issues here: what types of entities can be created and which tickets are introduced as the immediate result of a create operation. 
Create Rules
The tickets introduced by a create operation are speci ed by a create-rule for every pair u,v such that v2ccu. The create-rules are local in that the only tickets introduced are for the parent and child entities in the domains of these two entities. The motivation is that creation should immediately have only a local incremental impact on the state. We emphasize there is a di erent create-rule for each pair v2ccu.
Let subject U of type u create entity V of type v, so U is the parent and V the child. If V is an object the create-rule is speci ed as follows, where child is a special symbol signifying the created object. If V is a subject the situation is more complex since the create-rule must also specify tickets to beplaced in V's domain. So if v is a subject type the create-rule has two components as follows. These respectively specify tickets to be placed in the parent and child domains. Tickets for the parent and child are identi ed by the special symbols parent and child respectively. The interpretation is the parent U gets U x : c provided parent x : c 2cr p u,v and V x : c provided child x : c 2cr p u,v. Similarly the child V gets U x : c provided parent x : c 2cr c u,v and V x : c provided child x : c 2cr c u,v. The motivation for allowing a create-rule to introduce tickets for the parent in the parent's own domain is discussed at length in 34 .
The following example from the take-grant model 21 speci es that the parent subject gets copiable take and grant tickets for its child, while the child is created with an empty domain: cr p s,s = child rwc and cr c s,s = .
SUMMARY OF SPM
In summary, SPM requires the security administrator to specify an authorization scheme by de ning the following components.
1. A nite set of types T partitioned into disjoint sets of subject types TS and object types TO. 2. A nite set of rights R partitioned into disjoint sets of inert rights RI and control rights RC. A system is speci ed by de ning a scheme and the initial protection state, i.e., the initial set of entities and the initial distribution of tickets. Thereafter the state evolves by copy and create operations.
REVOCATION
SPM is monotonic in that it lacks facilities for revocation of tickets and deletion of entities. In any real system there must, of course, be mechanisms for revocation and deletion. Similarly, a n y implementation of SPM would also provide these mechanisms. Fortunately it turns out that under rather general assumptions revocation and deletion can beignored for safety analysis in the worst case. Revocation can be ignored in a worst-case scenario provided the e ect of revocation can be undone. We call this the restoration principle, i.e., whatever can be revoked can berestored 34 . In SPM, if a ticket obtained by a copy or demand operation is revoked it is easily restored by repeating the operation. However if a ticket introduced by a create operation is revoked, it may not be restorable by repeating the operation since each created entity is unique. Also tickets distributed in the initial state may not berestorable. If we assume tickets distributed in the initial state or introduced by create-rules are irrevocable, the restoration principle does not entail any loss of generality in context of SPM. The need for a restoration principle is also demonstrated by the lost object problem. With unrestricted revocation it is possible that all tickets for an object disappear. If tickets for this object cannot be generated on demand, the object thereby becomes inaccessible.
The situation regarding deletion of entities is similar. Here the restoration principle requires that an entity which can be deleted should be replaceable by an equivalent entity. In general this rules out deletion of entities present in the initial state. Regarding deletion of entities created subsequently, it is always possible to re-create an entity of the same type as was deleted. In other words the individuality of created entities is not signi cant for analysis of the safety problem whereas the individuality of entities in the initial state may b e signi cant.
To summarize, revocation and deletion policies which are consistent with the restoration principle can be ignored for analysis of the safety problem in a worst-case scenario.
AN EXAMPLE
We close this Section with a simple example of an SPM scheme based on the wellknown concept of ownership. A user is regarded as the owner of all les created by him and has complete discretion regarding access to these les. The following scheme speci es this policy in SPM.
Scheme 1 Basic owner-based policy. The types user and le correspond to users and les respectively. For simplicity, a single inert right x:c provides access to les. This su ces so long as the policy regarding the dynamics of di erent inert rights, such as the typical read, write, execute and append, remains the same. There are no control rights so only the universal link predicate is de ned. Tickets for les, with or without the copy ag, can be copied across universal links. Users can create les and get a copiable ticket for each created le.
Note that the speci cation f u user, user = f le xg would give u s a v ery di erent behavior. In this case tickets given by the owner of a le to other users cannot carry the copy ag. Consequently the owner is the only one who can ever grant privileges for an owned le to other users.
SAFETY IN SPM
In this Section we brie y review the safety analysis of SPM with respect to propagation of access rights. For a system, whose initial state and scheme are given, the safety problem asks whether or not there is a state reachable from the initial state, by the rules of the scheme, with V x : c in domU. The complication in analyzing this problem arises from the create operation. If the scheme does not allow creation safety is easily determined by a polynomial time algorithm 34 . We simply keep executing copy operations until the state stabilizes in the sense that further copy operations do not change any subject's domain. We call this stable state the no-creates maximal state. Our approach to dealing with creation is to break the analysis problem into two phases, as follows.
I. From the initial state construct an augmented state by create operations alone. II. Compute the no-creates maximal state from the augmented state of phase I.
This strategy works provided we h a ve a method for constructing a suitable augmented state. We need to prove somehow that subjects and objects in the augmented state account for the potentially unbounded set of entities which can be created.
There i s a v ery natural restriction under which the above strategy can be proved correct. De ne the cc-digraph to bethe directed graph with vertices T and an edge from u to v if and only if v2ccu. We say cc is acyclic if this graph is acyclic. If a subject creates two e n tities of the same type, there is no di erence between them as far as the scheme is concerned. So for purpose of safety analysis it su ces to create just one of them. Of course if cc has cycles the above procedure will not terminate. Indeed it has been shown that with arbitrary cycles in cc safety is undecidable 38 . So there is no algorithm for computing a suitable augmented state in general. For the most part it appears that cycles in cc do not arise in practice. In our experience cycles in cancreate occur only in the very special, but also very important, case where a subject is authorized to create new subjects of its own type. Such cycles are called loops and show up in the form u2ccu. In other words loops are cycles of length one in the cc-digraph. The augmenting construction for cc with loops is as follows.
procedure augment with loops eliminate loops from cc; perform the augment procedure; restore the loops in cc;
forall subjects U such that typeU2cctypeU do let U create a subject of type typeU; end In 34 it is proved that the no-creates maximal state obtained from this augmented state correctly answers the safety question provided the create-rules for loops in cc satisfy the following restriction.
De nition 2 A create-rule for a loop in cc is said to be attenuating if 1. cr c u,u cr p u,u 2. child x : c 2cr p u,u parent x : c 2cr p u,u
The motivation and justi cation for this de nition are discussed at length in 34 .
For our purpose in this paper, it is important to demonstrate that models subsumed by SPM are indeed subsumed by acyclic attenuating schemes, which are de ned as follows:
De nition 3 An SPM scheme is acyclic attenuating if its cc-digraph is acyclic or has loops with attenuating create-rules.
To summarize, safety is decidable for acyclic attenuating schemes. Moreover, the decision procedures given above are e cient unless the cc-digraph is very dense. This completes our review of SPM.
EQUIVALENCE OF SYSTEMS
Our main objective in this paper is to show that SPM subsumes three well-known protection models as special cases. In order to do this we m ust of course de ne what we mean by subsumption. We do so as follows:
De nition 4 We say that SPM subsumes a m o del M provided that for every system S which can be speci ed in M we can construct an equivalent SPM system S 0 .
To complete this de nition we need to de ne the meaning of equivalent." The simplest de nition of equivalence is perhaps the following one.
De nition 5 Two systems S and S 0 are said to be equivalent provided we can construct a mapping such that subject s can have access r to object o in S if and only if subject s can have access r to object o in S 0 .
By this de nition systems are equivalent if they have equivalent w orst case behavior. Note that there may besubstantial di erences between the details of system S and S 0 . For example:
1. Subject s may have to go through far more convoluted actions to acquire r access to object o, as compared to the actions of subject s in acquiring access r to object o. 2. There may beadditional subjects, objects and rights in S 0 that have no direct counterpart in S, but are present due to bookkeeping details in the simulation of S in S 0 . 3. The mapping may b e extremely complex although it must be computable.
Nevertheless, from a perspective of worst-case safety analysis, the two systems are equivalent. In other words if both systems are assumed to be infested with cooperating Trojan Horses who are determined to propagate access rights as far as possible, the net accesses in both systems will be identical. Therefore, safety analysis of S reduces to safety analysis of S 0 and vice versa.
The constructions of this paper show that the Bell-LaPadula multi-level security model 3 , take-grant models 16, 21, 41 and grammatical protection systems 10, 22 are all equivalent to acyclic attenuating schemes in SPM. Therefore, the safety analysis results of SPM also apply to these models. We reiterate that these three models, and SPM itself, are all subsumed by monotonic HRU. However, all known constructions of these models within HRU require multi-conditional commands i.e., commands whose conditions have two or more terms, whereas safety is undecidable in HRU even for bi-conditional commands i.e., commands whose conditions have exactly two terms.
The actual constructions given in this paper establish equivalence in a stronger sense than de nition 5. It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a formal de nition of stronger" in this context. The intuition is that stronger" means behavioral equivalence." That is, every state transition in S, s a y from state to state , can be mimicked by one or more state transitions in S 0 which applied to state result in state . In other words, it is not only the states of S which are being simulated in S 0 but also the individual transitions. It will beevident that this requirement is easily satis ed by the constructions of this paper. Most equivalence results in computer science are actually behavioral equivalence results. For example, the familiar equivalence between classes of automata and formal grammars is of the behavioral variety.
Consider an example to make this intuition clearer. The take-grant model has decidable safety, therefore it is trivial to give an equivalent H R U system S 0 for a given take-grant system S. We simply run the safety algorithm of take-grant, as part of the mapping, and construct the worst-case state as the target HRU system. These two systems are therefore worst-case equivalent with respect to safety. However, they are not behaviorally equivalent. In behavioral equivalence we are looking for simulation of actual behavior, so that what transpires in one system is accurately mimicked in the other. In other words behavioral equivalence requires equivalence of actual behavior, whereas de nition 5 only requires equivalence of worst-case behavior.
MULTILEVEL SECURITY MODELS
The Bell-LaPadula BLP model 3 is a well-known access control model for multilevel security policies, most often applied in the military. In this Section we show how BLP is subsumed by SPM. This construction demonstrates that the traditional black-and-white distinction between mandatory and discretionary controls in the BellLaPadula model, has an alternate expression in SPM in terms of constraints on the propagation of access rights. The SPM viewpoint has the advantage of providing explicit machinery for formulating policies in between" these two extremes.
There has been recent controversy about exactly what the rules of BLP are 5, 24, 2 5 , 27 . Moreover, since its original publication the model has been modi ed and reformulated in several ways in its application to speci c design and implementation projects 18, 19 . Nevertheless most versions of the model are closely related and there is a clearly identi able common core.
The key component in all versions of BLP is a lattice of security levels, usually derived from the military classi cation system 12, 18 . Each subject and object is assigned a level from this lattice. Access rights are represented in an access matrix, and the model speci es rules by which this matrix can be modi ed. The rules are open ended, in the sense there is no formal constraint on what a rule might be other than that it requires authorization by the current access matrix and transforms the access matrix to a new state. In practice the rules typically involve constraints on the relative security levels of subjects and objects pertaining to that operation.
The controversy about the model stems from the open-ended nature of the rules, since rules that are intuitively insecure can be de ned 24 . Rules which c hange the security levels of subjects and objects are particularly troublesome in this respect. Versions of the model in which these security levels are constant and cannot be changed are said to satisfy the tranquility requirement. Most practically used versions of the model do require tranquility. Sometimes the tranquility requirement is slightly relaxed to allow changes in security levels to be e ected by some designated security o cer. We shall examine how to accommodate such relaxations of tranquility within SPM at the end of this Section.
In this Section we consider two v ersions of the BLP model, both with strong tranquility requirements. Our rst version, de ned below, is adapted from Pittelli 30 who showed that the BLP model he considered is an instance of the access matrix model as formalized by Harrison, Ruzzo and Ullman 14 . We show that with tranquility this model can beexpressed as an SPM scheme.
De nition 6 The BLP model with tranquility de nes a system as follows.
1. = fS 1 , . . . , S m g, the set of subjects.
2. = fO 1 , . . . , O n g, the set of objects where = .
3. = f 1 , . . . , o g, the lattice of security levels with dominance relation w.
4. : ! , the current security level of subjects and objects. 5. max : ! , the maximum security level of subjects i.e., max S i wS i .
6. max S i , O j are constants tranquility.
7. R = fr, w, og, the set of access rights read, write, own. 8. An mn discretionary access matrix M, with M i,j R specifying the discretionary access rights of S i to O j . 9. Subject S i can create object O j with arbitrary O j . Immediately after creation o2M i,j , that is the creator is the owner of the object. 10. The owner of an object can give read and write access to that object to another subject. That is, if o2M i,j then S i can enter r o r w in M k,j for any k.
11. An mn current access matrix B, with B i,j fr,wg, specifying the current access rights of S i to O j determined for r and w as follows. k k In the original BLP formulation B i,j is a subset of B i,j as de ned here. This is because rights are entered in B only as per the actual accesses attempted by subjects. In other words the if and only if" , in the two conditions enumerated here is actually an only if" in the original BLP model 3 . The if and only if" formulation we h a ve c hosen is slightly simpler to deal with, although it is possible to simulate the original BLP only if" formulation if so desired. r2B i,j , r2M i,j ^S i wO j Simple security w2B i,j , w2M i,j ^S i vO j Star-property There is a xed set of subjects. The current security level of a subject is given by and can change so long as it is dominated by the subject's maximum security level given by max . Subjects are allowed to create objects, and on doing so the creator becomes the owner of the created object. Each object has a security level assigned at the time of creation and given by . Tranquility implies that this level cannot change. Versions of BLP without tranquility usually have a security o cer subject who can change for objects and possibly max for subjects. The potential dangers of unrestrained non-tranquility are demonstrated in 24 . The owner of an object has discretion regarding who may access that object. However, access can beexercised only if it is consistent with simple security and the star-property. The star-property is also called the con nement property. Sometimes append and execute rights are also de ned. We have dropped these for simplicity since these could behandled in much the same way as read and write in our construction.
Before proceeding further it is worth clarifying a point of terminology. What we are calling security levels" or simply levels," that is the elements of the security lattice, are often called classi cations" or clearances" in the literature. The term classi cation" is typically used for objects while subjects have clearances." Moreover, military classi cations are derived by combining a linearly ordered level and a set of compartments or caveats. The security lattice is derived by combining the linear ordering on levels with the subset relation on compartments. In the formalism it is irrelevant how the elements of the lattice are derived, so we can simply begin with a given lattice whose elements we call levels. Actually, the levels need not even constitute a lattice. For access control models it su ces that the levels bepartially ordered.
One di culty in constructing an SPM scheme equivalent to BLP is that the current security level of a BLP subject can change, resulting in changes in the current access matrix B. Lowering S i shrinks the set of objects that S i can read while expanding the set of objects which S i can write. Similarly raising S i expands the set of objects that S i can read while shrinking the set of objects which S i can write. This non-monotonic behavior implies that a BLP subject cannot bemodeled as a single SPM subject. We circumvent this problem by mapping a BLP subject with varying to a set of SPM subjects, each with a xed security level. Speci cally the BLP subject S i is mapped to the set fS i l j max S i w l g of SPM subjects. Each SPM subject S i l has the xed security level l and is of the SPM type l . The idea is that S i l simulates the BLP subject S i when S i = l . SPM subjects derived from the same BLP subject in this manner are said to be cohorts. The connection between cohorts is maintained by setting up cohort links between every pair of cohorts. This allows ownership of an object created by a BLP subject to be shared among the SPM cohorts for that BLP subject.
In our construction each BLP object is mapped to an SPM subject. Speci cally, a BLP object with current security level l is mapped to an SPM subject of type o l . These SPM subjects are passive entities which cannot initiate any operations. The reason they are subjects is they possess tickets with the rc and wc rights for themselves. These self tickets" are useful at various places in the simulation. They allow us, for instance, to conveniently specify that the SPM cohorts that own an object can obtain read and write tickets for that object, provided simple security and the star-property are not violated.
The second di culty in our construction arises from the ability of a BLP subject S i to create a BLP object O j with arbitrary O j . Now consider what happens if max S i 6 wO j . By simple security the creator S i cannot read the created object O j . However by virtue of being the owner, S i has the ability to give read access for O j to other subjects. In our simulation at least one of the SPM cohorts of S i , say S i l , should beable to give read access to O j to cohorts of other BLP subjects. But this requires that S i l possess the O j rc ticket and thereby have read access to O j , contrary to simple security. This situation appears to indicate an inherent limitation of the SPM copy operation, i.e., SPM requires a subject to possess a right before that right can begiven to another subject. Similar problems arise in the following situations where S i is the creator of O j . There is an elegant, and quite general, technique by which SPM gets around this apparent limitation of its copy operation, by means of links and lter functions. The key idea is to introduce new right symbolsr : c andŵ : c , which control the ability to give read and write access respectively to other subjects. These right symbols are converted to r and w respectively if so allowed by simple security and the starproperty.
These considerations lead us to de ne the following scheme.
Scheme 2 BLP with tranquility. The subscripts on these links have the following mnemonic signi cance: u for universal, o for owner, k for cohort,r for discretionary read access, andŵ for discretionary write access. 4. Unde ned values of the lter functions are assumed by default to be . The simple security and star properties of BLP are respectively enforced by fr and fŵ. Discretionary control over access to a created entity is enforced by f k , f o , f u and the create-rules. Note that cc is acyclic and sparse so safety for this scheme is decidable in polynomial time by the technique of Section 3. This is in contrast to Pittelli's instantiation of BLP in HRU 30 where the resulting HRU system does not fall within the decidable cases of 14 because Pittelli's construction uses multiconditional HRU commands.
To complete the construction we de ne the initial state to be as follows, where SUB is the initial set of subjects in the SPM system. The correspondence between the BLP model of de nition 6 and its realization by the above SPM system is almost self-evident. Scheme 2 expresses the BLP rules in a natural and intuitive manner without straining the SPM notation. Thus BLP is an instance of SPM not merely in some obscure theoretical sense, but actually in an intuitively meaningful manner. We n o w establish the following result.
Theorem 1 The BLP system of de nition 6 and the SPM scheme 2 with its speci ed initial state are equivalent.
Proof: To establish equivalence between the two systems we rst show how each control operation in the BLP system is simulated by a sequence of control operations in the SPM system, which have the same net e ect regarding distribution of read, write and owner rights. There are four control operations in BLP shown in table 1 along with the SPM operations which simulate these. The general idea is that any operation executed by the BLP subject S i with S i = p is simulated by a sequence of operations initiated by the SPM cohort S i p . Creation of object O j by subject S i is simulated by letting S i p create O j . Ownership of O j is transferred to the other cohorts of S i using link k 's. These cohort links are established in constructing the initial state and are static, since the cohort right k cannot be copied. So it is exactly the SPM cohorts of S i who can share ownership of O j . Ownership in BLP implies the right to give read or write access to other subjects. This is simulated by letting each SPM cohort obtain O j r wc from domO j using link o . In this manner each SPM cohort of S i has the authorization to give read and write access for its owned objects to other subjects. The BLP operation of S i giving S k read access to O j is simulated in SPM by letting S i p copy O j r from its own domain to every SPM cohort of S k . Cohorts of S k whose level dominates O j can then copy O j r from domO j using linkr. Cohorts of S k whose level does not dominate O j are denied this ability by fr. So simple security is enforced in the SPM simulation by fr. The BLP operation of S i giving S k write access to O j is similarly simulated in SPM with the star-property enforced by fŵ. The BLP operation of subject S i changing its current level is ignored in SPM. In BLP this operation has the e ect of modifying row i of the current access matrix B to preserve simple security and the star-property. This is accounted for in the SPM simulation by the manner in which the SPM cohorts of S i at di erent levels obtain read and write tickets.
To complete the demonstration of equivalence it remains to show the converse property that each SPM control operation can be simulated by a BLP operation Accounted for in simulating operations 2 and 3. Of these only operations 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6, i.e., object creation and copying ofr andŵ, are explicitly simulated in BLP; respectively as object creation and giving of read and write access. SPM operation 2 establishes shared ownership of an object between SPM cohorts and needs no simulation. Operation 7 and 8 respectively convertr andŵ rights to r and w. These are accounted for in BLP by the current access matrix B which is automatically changed to preserve simple security and the star-property whenever the current security level of a subject changes. 2
Next we consider a v ersion of BLP with subjects who are given more power than allowed by the simple security and star properties of de nition 6. This model is based on the security properties of 4 in the so-called network interpretation of multilevel security. The basic idea is to allow subjects to violate simple security and star properties in a controlled manner. This is achieved by associating a pair of security levels vmax S i and amin S i with each subject S i , with the subscripts respectively read as view-maximum and alter-minimum. It is required that vmax S i w amin S i . The range of a subject is the set of levels bounded by vmax and amin as follows. rangeS i = f k j vmax S i w k w amin S i g Subject S i is allowed to read and write objects whose security levels are in rangeS i . Outside this range requirements similar to simple security and the star-property are stipulated as follows. Since vmax w amin we can view these requirements as respectively generalizing simple security to require that all levels in rangeS i dominate O j , and the star-property t o require that O j dominates all levels in rangeS i . Within rangeS i simple security and the star-property are not enforced.
The SPM simulation in this case is actually simpler than the previous one since there is no notion of a changing current security level for subjects. So, there is no need for SPM cohorts. Each BLP subject is mapped to a single SPM subject whose type is determined by vmax and amin of the BLP subject. We have the following scheme.
Scheme 3 BLP network interpretation with tranquility. The subscripts on these links have the following mnemonic signi cance: u for universal, o for owner,r for discretionary read access, andŵ for discretionary write access. 4. Unde ned values of the lter functions are assumed by default to be . We can establish equivalence between the BLP and SPM systems as was done in theorem 1 for the construction of scheme 2. Because of the absence of cohorts the proof will be simpler in this case. Next consider the Biba integrity model 6 which is the exact dual of BLP with the aim of controlling unauthorized modi cation of information rather than unauthorized disclosure. Its de nition is obtained from de nition 6 by making the following replacements.
The lattice of security levels is replaced by a lattice of integrity levels. Each subject has a minimum integrity level designated by min . The current integrity level of the subject must dominate min at all times. Simple security and the star-property are replaced by the following. r2B i,j , r2M i,j ^S i vO j Simple integrity w2B i,j , w2M i,j ^S i wO j Integrity star-property That is a subject is only allowed to read objects of the same or higher integrity as itself and to write objects of the same or lower integrity. Given the constructions for BLP it is no surprise that the Biba model can be instantiated in SPM. We simply need to reverse the dominance relations in fr and fŵ of scheme 2. Similarly by reversing the dominance relation of the BLP construction we obtain the proper initial state. Lee 20 and Schockley 39 formulate integrity models which are duals of the BLP network interpretation. These can be expressed in SPM as the dual of scheme 3. It is also possible for the Biba and BLP models to coexist in a single system. If the same lattice is used for both models, their coexistence implies that a subject can read or write only at its current level. More generally the two models can coexist with independent lattices, so each subject and object has a security level and an independent integrity level. Such coexistence can beeasily modeled in SPM by combining the rules of the two models. We conclude that the mandatory controls of the BLP model for nondisclosure and of the Biba model for integrity are special cases of the more general mandatory controls of SPM.
Finally it is worth considering what kind of non-tranquility can be accommodated in a monotonic manner in SPM. To be speci c consider scheme 2. Non-tranquility i n BLP is usually speci ed by including a security o cer subject who has the authority to enroll new subjects, change max of existing subjects, and change of existing objects. In SPM we can de ne a new subject type sec-o with one instance in the initial state to model the security o cer. Creation of new subjects can be simulated by allowing the security o cer to create a collection of SPM cohorts and giving him the ability to connect them by link k 's. Changing max S i from p to q can be similarly modeled so long as q w p . The security o cer simply introduces new cohorts of S i at levels dominated by q but not by p , and connects these to the existing cohorts of S i and each other by link k 's. If q 6 w p we need to delete some of the existing cohorts.
Since this might delete some cohorts which existed in the initial state we w ould need to treat this as being a di erent SPM system. Changing the security level of an object requires revocation of read and write privileges to preserve simple security and the star-property, and would again have to be treated as a transition to a di erent SPM system. Note that with this kind of unrestricted power given to a security o cer there really is no safety in the system, unless we assume the security o cer does not change security levels arbitrarily. So for purpose of safety analysis one does assume some form of tranquility.
TAKE-GRANT MODELS
Of all the models discussed in this paper, take-grant is closest in viewpoint t o SPM. Its SPM simulation is, therefore, a very natural one. Take-grant derives its name from its two control rights t take and g grant. Several papers have been published on this model, including 16, 21, 40 . Inevitably there are slight di erences in the precise de nition of the model in these papers. Our presentation follows Snyder's review 40 of the model most closely. Several variations of take-grant h a ve also been proposed 9, 23 . These variations are also easily speci ed in SPM.
The SPM simulation of the basic take-grant model is given as schemes VI through VIII of 34 . In this paper we extend the construction to accommodate analysis of theft in take-grant 41 . This shows how assumptions about behavior are easily expressed in SPM.
Transfer of information in the take-grant model has been analyzed by Bishop and Snyder 7 . The control operations used for this purpose are a special case of grammatical protection systems which are modeled in SPM in the next Section. Analysis of combined authority and information transfer and theft 8 can beaccommodated in SPM by combining the constructions of this Section with those of the following Section. In this way w e are able to cover the analysis results of take-grant within the analysis framework of Section 3 for SPM.
Let us brie y review scheme VIII of 34 which is equivalent to the so called subject-object version of take-grant 16 . In this scheme there are two types of subjects: as for active subjects and ps for passive subjects. A passive subject cannot execute operations and is merely a repository for tickets. In SPM terms, the takegrant model de nes two link predicates as follows, where the subscripts have o b vious mnemonic signi cance.
A link g requires a grant capability at the source while a link t requires a take capability
The equivalence is not absolute since, strictly speaking, the take-grant model does not allow a subject to possess tickets for itself. It appears this restriction cannot be speci ed in SPM, without some drastic step such as declaring each subject to be of a distinct type unique to itself. However, as observed by S n yder 40 this is not a fundamental feature of take-grant. Moreover, the restriction is unnecessarily restrictive in that we often want a subject to possess rights for itself so as to give these to other subjects at that subject's discretion. We also need to assume that all tickets in the SPM initial state are copiable.
at the destination. A link can be exercised only if authorized by a ticket in the domain of an active subject, i.e., link g U,V can be exercised only if U is active whereas link t U,V can beexercised only if V is active. There is otherwise no selectivity in the copy operation. Passive subjects are not allowed to create subjects whereas active subjects can create both passive and active subjects. All this is easily speci ed in SPM as follows.
Scheme 4
The take-grant model with passive subjects.
1. TS = fas, psg, TO = 2. RC = ft:c, g:cg, RI = some nite set disjoint from RC 3. link g U,V V g2domU link t U,V U t2domV 4. f g as, asjps = T R f g ps, asjps = f t asjps , as = TR f t asjps , ps = 5. ccas = fas, psg ccps = 6. There is a uniform create-rule with cr p =child R and cr c = Here we introduce abbreviated notation to keep the scheme compact. The interpretation of asjps is that it is an abbreviation for all combinations of the bracketed terms. For example in the above case the verbose de nition of f g is understood to be as follows. f g as, as = TR f g as, ps = TR f g ps, as = f g ps, ps = In addition to its compactness this notation is useful in highlighting the similarities and di erences between types.
The create-rule in scheme 4 is not attenuating and there is a loop in cc due to as2ccas. So as it stands the scheme is not acyclic attenuating and thereby does not fall within the known decidable cases of SPM. However scheme 4 can easily be modi ed to be attenuating by the technique described in 34 of distinguishing the initial set of subjects from those created subsequently. The remaining schemes of this Section are all non-attenuating in the same way as scheme 4. This technique can be used in all constructions of this paper to obtain an equivalent attenuating version.
We now show how the notion of theft as de ned by Snyder 41 for the takegrant model can bespeci ed by an SPM scheme. This notion assumes that certain subjects will not carry out particular operations even though they are authorized to do so. That is these subjects are trusted not to cooperate in some speci c way for propagating tickets. There are numerous assumptions about behavior that one could make. Snyder analyzes a particular set of assumptions, but would need to carry out similar and perhaps more complicated analysis if these assumptions are changed. One of the great advantages of SPM is that assumptions about the behavior of subjects can be easily speci ed as part of a scheme. To demonstrate this we show how the speci c assumptions used by Snyder are stated in SPM.
Snyder's concept of theft is that a ticket Y x is stolen by a subject U provided the following conditions hold. 3. There is a reachable state with Y x 2 domU.
In other words theft is said to occur if U is able to obtain Y x, even if subjects possessing Y xc in the initial state do not give it away to anybody. We can model these assumptions in SPM by distinguishing di erent t ypes of subjects. First we distinguish trusted subjects from untrusted ones. Since passive subjects cannot exercise the grant operation, this distinction applies only to active subjects. Next we need to distinguish entities that are con dential from those that are non-con dential. The assumed behavior of trusted subjects applies only to con dential entities. They are free to grant tickets for non-con dential entities, but are constrained by their behavior in granting tickets for con dential entities. The notions of trusted and con dential are independent attributes of subjects, so we need to de ne subjects types for all possible combinations of these as given in the top four rows of table 3. Passive subjects are unable to exercise the grant privilege, so they are inherently trusted. This gives us the two bottom rows of table 3. Finally we identify the rights RT which will not begranted by trusted subjects for con dential entities. That is trusted subjects are assumed not to grant tickets of type ftcas,ucas,cpsgRT even if authorized to so, but may grant tickets of type ftcas,ucas,cpsgR,RT. This is speci ed by setting the value of f g from trusted subjects to all other subjects to beTR,ftcas,ucas,cpsgRT. The value of f g from untrusted subjects to all other subjects remains unchanged as TR. All values of f t remain unchanged.
This results in the following scheme. Scheme 5 Theft of rights in the take-grant model.
1. TS = ftcas, tnas, ucas, unas, cps, npsg, T O = Let CS = ftcas, ucas, cpsg be the set of con dential types 2. RC = ft:c, g:cg, RI = some nite set disjoint from RC Let RT R be the set of rights whose theft we are analyzing 3. link g U,V V g2domU link t U,V U t2domV 4. Let TS tcasjtnasjucasjunasjcpsjnps f g tcasjtnas , TS = TR , CSRT f g ucasjunas , TS = TR f g cpsjnps , TS = f t TS , tcasjtnasjucasjunas = TR f t TS , cpsjnps = 5. cc tcasjtnasjucasjunas = funas, npsg cc cpsjnps = 6. There is a uniform create-rule with cr p =child R and cr c = We can as easily model a di erent notion of theft in which s a y the trusted subjects do not grant any take rights in addition to the above restriction. We simply need to change f g as follows.
f g tcasjtnas , TS = TR , CSRT TSft:cg Or perhaps the assumption that trusted subjects do not grant a n y take rights except to other trusted subjects, speci ed by modifying f g as follows. The structure of SPM gives us a powerful framework for investigating the consequences of such assumptions about behavior. In the take-grant framework each of these separate notions of theft would require a separate analysis along the lines of 7, 8, 16, 21, 41 . In SPM these alternate notions require separate schemes, but the same analysis algorithm of Section 3 can beused in all cases. Moreover in the SPM framework ad hoc assumptions about behavior can be accommodated quite easily. In the limit each individual user may b e treated separately for this purpose.
GRAMMATICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS
Grammatical protection systems GPS were de ned by Lipton and Budd 22 and shown to have a close relation to context-free grammars. Safety in these systems is reduced to a parsing problem which is decidable in polynomial time. The subsumption of GPS by SPM demonstrates the ability of SPM to simulate models whose control operations are at rst sight quite contrary to SPM control operations. It is also signi cant because, in combination with the constructions of the previous Section, it allows us to accommodate notions of information and authority transfer and theft in take-grant within SPM.
There is no create operation in GPS so the system has a xed set of subjects. The protection state of the system is visualized as a graph in which there is a directed edge labeled from U to V, shown as U ,! V, if U possesses the set of rights for V. In other words, U ,! V if and only if subject U possesses the tickets V .
The rules for changing the protection state are expressed in one of the forms indicated in table 4 where , and are non-empty sets of rights. The interpretation of these rules is straightforward. A class I rule says that if U possesses V and V possesses W then U can acquire W . Similarly a class II rule says that if U possesses V and W possesses V then U can acquire W . Class III and IV rules are similarly interpreted.
The relation of these systems to context-free grammars is strongest when , and are singleton sets. However the safety analysis algorithms are applicable to the more general case where they are arbitrary non-empty sets 10 . The rules for modeling transfer of information in the take-grant model 7 are actually instances of GPS rules as shown in table 5. Here r and w are the standard read and write privileges, while r 0 is a pseudo-privilege denoting implicit read. So we d o h a ve a realistic interpretation for each of the rule classes. Moreover the simulation of grammatical protection systems in SPM thereby also subsumes the information transfer analysis of the take-grant model. Combined analysis of authority and information transfer and theft in takegrant can beaccommodated in SPM by combining the constructions of this Section De nition 7 A grammatical protection system is de ned by specifying a xed set of subjects, a xed set of rights and a xed collection of rules of the form indicated in table 4.
The general de nition of grammatical protection systems actually includes the notion of subject types. The rules are typed in that U, V and W are required to be of speci c types as speci ed for each rule. However GPS with multiple types can be reduced to GPS with a single type by i n troducing new right symbols which e ectively encode the type information 10 . So it su ces to consider GPS without types. GPS rules appear in many w ay contrary to SPM operations and o er a signi cant challenge for the expressive power of SPM. The major problem is that the rights introduced by a GPS rule may not be present i n a n y subject's domain prior to applying the rule. For instance in a class I or III rule, V is required to possess W but U ends up with W where and may not be related in any way. In class II and IV rules there may b e no tickets at all for W and yet U acquires W .
We are able to get around this problem by simulating each GPS subject by a number of SPM subjects of di erent types. The collection of SPM subjects which simulate the GPS subject X are said to be cohorts of X and of each other. This general idea of using several cohorts to simulate a single subject is similar to our use of cohorts in simulating the multilevel security models of Section 5. Of course the connections between the cohorts and the role they play in the simulation are now quite di erent. In this case the construction is much more intricate. We n o w explain the underlying intuition. For a GPS system with n rules, numbered 1 through n, we de ne the following subject types in SPM. TS = fs, sg, sl, sr, sm 1 , sm 2 , . . . , sm n g
The intention is that a GPS subject X besimulated by a set of SPM cohorts which has one memb e r o f e a c h of these types, as shown below.
SPM cohorts of X = fX, X g , X l , X r , X m 1 , . . . , X mn g By convention the type of each SPM cohort is s concatenated with the superscript on the cohort's name. So X g is of type sg, X l of type sl, and so on. If the superscript is missing, as in X, its type is simply s. The type s SPM subjects are the ones which simulate the actual domain of GPS subjects. We will establish that Y 2domX in the SPM system if and only if X ,! Y in the GPS system. However domX may contain tickets for subjects of type other than s, which are used for the simulation.
We regard the type s SPM cohort to be the one which truly" simulate each GPS subject. SPM subjects of type other than s are an artifact of the simulation. The SPM cohorts X l and X r respectively simulate the role of the GPS subject X when a rule with X at the left end or right end is invoked. When a rule with the GPS subject X in the middle is invoked we h a ve a di erent cohort of X for each rule. The role of the GPS subject X as the middle subject in rule i is simulated by its cohort X m i . In these cases the superscripts have obvious mnemonic signi cance. It remains to consider SPM subjects of type sg. In our construction the cohort X g serves as a source or generator of tickets for the GPS subject X, when a rule with X at the right end is invoked note that in table 4 it is always the subject at the left end which acquires rights for the subject at the right end. Each generator cohort X g possesses all tickets for itself and for X, that is domX g contains X g R as well as X R.
Invocation of rule i in the GPS system with X, Y and Z as the left, middle and right subjects respectively is simulated as depicted in gure 1 where each directed edge denotes an SPM link. A sequence of links is established from Z g to Z r to Y m i to X l to X. The SPM scheme ensures that the links from Z r to Y m i and from Y m i to X l , in this sequence, can beestablished if and only if rule i is authorized in the GPS system. Let X obtain Z as a result of invoking rule i in the GPS system. The links and lter functions in the SPM scheme are de ned so it is possible to copy exactly Z g c from domZ g to domX using the above sequence of links. Finally by virtue of possessing Z g , X is allowed to obtain Z c from domZ g .
Let RG be the set of rights in the GPS system, extended to occur with and without the SPM copy ag. Let k be a symbol, denoting cohort, which does not occur in RG.
We de ne the rights in the SPM simulation to beRG fk : c g. Since GPS has no copy ag, we will make sure that all rights in RG which are in domX have the SPM copy ag. We say that tickets of type s r : c for r2RG are GPS tickets. All other types of tickets are said to be non-GPS tickets.
The SPM cohorts of X are connected to X by placing X k in their domains. This sets up a cohort link from X to each of its cohorts. Note that the cohort link is authorized by a k t i c ket at the destination. We also de ne the inverse-cohort link by requiring the k ticket at the source. A cohort link is therefore always accompanied by an inverse-cohort link in the opposite direction. The formal de nitions are respectively as follows.
We de ne f k from s to sl, sr and sm i to be s RG. This has the e ect that every GPS ticket in domX can be copied to X l , X r and X m i . Moreover this is the only way that these cohorts of X can acquire GPS tickets. A further connection between X and its X l , X r and X m i cohorts is that X possesses all tickets for these cohorts. These non-GPS tickets play a crucial role in the simulation as explained below.
To simulate the GPS rules we de ne and inverse-links for each set of rights which occurs as , or in a GPS rule, respectively as follows. The net e ect, with respect to gure 1, is that for rules with a left to right edge we establish link Y m i ,X l , while for rules with a right to left edge we establish link^ Y m i ,X l . Similarly for rules with a left to right edge we establish link Z r ,Y m i , while for rules with a right t o left edge we establish link^ Z r ,Y m i . To ensure that these links can be established if and only if the corresponding GPS rule is authorized we de ne f from a type s subject to be as follows. To continue the simulation of the GPS rules we somehow have to get the Z c ticket in domX. This is achieved by the common su x" portion of table 6. Recall that Z g possesses the tickets Z R and Z g R. We connect Z g to Z r by a n i n verse-cohort link, by placing Z r k in domZ g . By de ning f^ksg,sr to be sg R we allow Z r to acquire Z g R. We allow Z g c to becopied from Z r to Y m i to X l provided rule i of the GPS system lets X obtain Z . We achieve this by the following de nitions. The e ect of all this so far is to enable X l to acquire Z g c, if X can obtain Z in the GPS system. Now there is an inverse-cohort link from X l to X, so by de ning f^ksl,s to besg R, X is able to acquire Z g in our simulation. The nal step is to allow X to obtain Z c from domZ g over this link Z r ,X. This is easily achieved by de ning f sg,s t o bes c.
The construction is now almost complete. We could in fact stop at this point and simply construct the initial state of the SPM system from the initial state of the GPS system as follows. For each subject X in the GPS system introduce the SPM cohorts X, X g , X l , X r , X m 1 , . . . , X mn with their initial domains as given below. domX = fY cj X ,! Y i n t h e GPS systemg fX l , X r , X m 1 , . . . , X mn g R domX l = X k domX r = X k domX m i = X k, i = 1 . . . n domX g = X R X g R X r k
This would su ce since GPS systems have no create operation. On the other hand GPS can be easily extended to include create operations. In fact to simulate combined authority and information transfer and theft in the take-grant model, we need to combine the constructions of this Section with those of the previous one. In doing so we w ould need to allow creation of subjects and their cohorts. It is therefore important to show that the cohorts with appropriate domains can actually be realized by SPM create operations. For the most part this is straightforward and simply requires suitable de nition of cc and the create-rules. It seems proper to authorize creation by letting the type s subjects create the other types of cohorts. That is, ccs = fsg, sl, sr, sm 1 , sm 2 , . . . , sm n g
All other values of cc are empty. The initial state can then be de ned to simply consist o f a t ype s subject X for each GPS subject X with domX = fY cj X ,! Y i n t h e GPS systemg
Tickets relating X to its cohorts can then be introduced by the create-rules. A minor complication arises from the requirement that X r k2domX g . We can achieve this by copying X r k from X to X g , for which purpose we de ne f k s,sg t o b e sr k. With this set up we can easily extend the construction to allow subject creation by placing s in cc. The above discussion results in the following scheme.
Scheme 6 Grammatical protection systems with n rules numbered 1 . . . n.
Z r : c 2domX there exists a GPS state in which X ,! Z with r2
By the results of 34 as discussed in Section 3, we can ignore create operations for safety analysis by assuming that each SPM subject of type s creates one instance of each of the remaining types. So from this augmented state we need to consider only copy operations. We prove the above assertion by induction on the numberof copy operations in the SPM system. For the basis case let this numberbe0 and the assertion follows trivially from construction of the initial state. Assume the assertion is true for states derived by less than n copy operations. If the n-th operation is other than copying Z r : c to X, the assertion follows by induction hypothesis. Otherwise by inspection of the scheme it is evident that Z r : c can be copied to domX only from domZ g o ver some link where r2 . This requires Z g 2domX. It is further evident that Z g can be copied to domX only from domX l over link^k, which can be established only by the create-rules. Now subjects of type sl can obtain tickets of type sg c only from subjects of type sm i . So there must exist some Y m i from which Z g c w as copied to X l . There are four cases to consider. Let rule i be of class I. In this GPS state rule i is authorized so X can obtain rights for Z, where r2 . This completes the induction step when rule i i s of class I. For the other cases where rule i is of class II, IIIor IV the induction step can be similarly proved. 2 
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown how versions of Bell-LaPadula multi-level security model 3 , take-grant models 16, 21, 41 and grammatical protection systems 10, 22 can be speci ed as SPM schemes. This work complements our earlier e orts in demonstrating the modeling power of SPM by considering speci c policies of practical interest 32, 33, 3 4 , 36 . It is encouraging that SPM o ers a uni ed framework in which these diverse models and policies can be expressed. It is moreover remarkable, that in all these cases the SPM schemes satisfy the acyclic attenuating assumption required for safety analysis 34 .
The results of this paper are in sharp contrast to results for the Harrison-RuzzoUllman HRU access-matrix model 14 . HRU does subsume all the models discussed in this paper in terms of expressive power. However, all known constructions of these models within HRU require multi-conditional commands i.e., commands whose conditions have two or more terms, whereas safety is undecidable in HRU even for bi-conditional commands i.e., commands whose conditions have exactly two terms.
Our construction for multilevel models establishes that the traditional label-based mandatory controls of multilevel security h a ve an alternate expression in terms of the type-based constraints on propagation of access rights imposed by SPM. The SPM viewpoint has the advantage of providing explicit machinery for formulating policies in between" the two extremes of mandatory and discretionary policies in the BellLaPadula model. The construction for theft in take-grant models emphasizes that a protection model with the generality of SPM is useful, even for a system with very speci c control operations. This is because assumptions about behavior can bemodeled in SPM. Most systems implement very speci c control operations, and safety can be guaranteed only with such additional assumptions.
Our construction for grammatical protection systems demonstrates the ability o f SPM to simulate models whose control operations appear to be contrary to SPM operations. GPS rules are particularly troublesome in this regard, since they actually allow new privileges to be created. This indicates that SPM has abstracted some essential properties of control operations in protection models. This abstraction is probably more fundamental than the viewpoint which lead us to develop the SPM rules in the rst place. It is also signi cant, because in combination with the takegrant constructions it allows us to accommodate the take-grant notions of information and authority transfer and theft within SPM.
We conjecture that SPM is in some sense equivalent to the monotonic access matrix, in which delete and destroy operations are not allowed 15 . Some kind of equivalence is inevitable since both models have undecidable safety in general and both are monotonic. The interesting question is whether or not SPM has behavioral equivalence to monotonic HRU, in the sense discussed in Section 4. Resolution of this question will provide a signi cant advance in our understanding of protection models. It has recently been shown by Ammann and Sandhu 1, 2 that extending SPM to have a multi-parent joint create operation gives us equivalence to monotonic HRU. It has also been conjectured that SPM is actually less expressive than monotonic HRU under the terms of behavioral equivalence. The precise relationship of the expressive power of SPM with respect to extended SPM or monotonic HRU remains an important o p e n question.
Finally, we are well aware that SPM is a monotonic model and the question of extending it to include some non-monotonic features such as transfer-only privileges and mutually exclusive privileges is an important research issue. It appears that some aspects of the integrity policies considered by Clark and Wilson 11 and others 29, 35, 42 will need such features. However as demonstrated by Budd 10 it does not take very much to get into intractable analysis problems with such non-monotonic privileges. Developing a suitable model which includes non-monotonic privileges and has tractable safety analysis is an important and di cult research problem. Our work on SPM provides a basis for this research.
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